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THE EN BANc REHEARING OF IN RE DILLON:




A patent on a chemical composition may be granted if it is estab-
lished that the composition is useful, novel,' and nonobvious.2 The
nonobvious standard divides new and useful technological improve-
ments which result from a genuinely creative scientific effort from those
which merely employ common substitutions or variations.
3
Courts have struggled over the years to determine when a chemical
composition may be deemed prima facie obvious. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's recent decision in the en banc rehearing of In re
Dillon4 reflects this continuing struggle. As a practical matter, the deci-
sion serves to raise the inventor's burden of satisfying the nonobvious-
ness test.
This article examines the policy implications of the Dillon decision
upon both chemical patent application prosecutions and the economics
of the patent system. Section one discusses nonobviousness. Section
two examines the evolution of the prima facie obvious standard for
chemical compositions. Section three discusses the Dillon case. Section
four analyzes the policy implications of the Dillon decision.
I. NONOBVIOUSNESS
Any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof is potentially pat-
entable. 5 A patentable invention must additionally satisfy the "nonobvi-
ousness" test.
6
* Associate Attorney, Greenlee and Associates, P.C., Boulder, CO;J.D., University
of Denver College of Law, 1988; B.A., University of Colorado, 1978.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Denver College of Law; M.S., University of Utah,
1986; B.A., University of Utah, 1980.
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988).
2. Id. § 103.
3. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (I 1 How.) 248 (1851) the Supreme Court, in
deciding that a method of making doorknobs from clay was unpatentable, interpreted the
Patent Act as demanding inventiveness (today called nonobviousness). Id. at 267. The
Court said that "unless more ingenuity and skill... were required... than were possessed
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree
of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention." Id.
4. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
6. Id. § 103.
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In 1952, Congress codified the nonobviousness requirement in title
35, section 103 of the United States Code. Section 103 provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not iden-
tically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
7
The addition of this section served only to codify a condition upon
which courts had long since insisted.8 Congress adopted section 103 in
order to stabilize the judicially created "inventiveness" standard. 9 In
doing so, Congress made it clear that to obtain a patent, a device must
be more than simply novel and useful; it must satisfy the "nonobvious-
ness" standard. 10
Thirteen years later, in Graham v. John Deere Co,1 1 the Supreme
Court interpreted this standard. The Court concluded that "the section
was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing
the Hotchkiss12 condition, with congressional directions that inquiries
into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a
prerequisite to patentability."' 3 The Court stated that section 103 per-
mits a more practical test of patentability,14 noting that patent validity is
ultimately a question of law which "lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries."' 5
7. Id.
8. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, repinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2394, 2399.
9. See Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came To Be, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE
CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:201, 1:206 (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980) where the author
explains:
Out of that decision [Hotchkiss] came the 'requirement for invention'-the re-
quirement that to be patentable an invention had to involve a mysterious quality
called 'invention' .... [The third requirement, beyond the novelty and utility
which were in the statute, and which evolved purely as case law, became.., the
'plaything of the judiciary' and meant anything the judges chose to make it mean.
The author notes that the patent bar perceived an antagonism in the judiciary toward
patents. He suggests that the discontent began with the Supreme Court's decision in
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). This Court, while
applying the Hotchkiss rule in a patent case, declared something unpatentable because it
lacked a "flash of creative genius." Id. at 90. The patent bar, irked by this highly subjec-
tive standard, pushed for the codification of the standard which, as the author points out,
was named "inventiveness." S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1952 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2394, 2399 ("This section should have a stabilizing effect and
minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.").
10. See Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention"as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESs-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:401, 1:408 (J.
Witherspoon ed. 1980) ("What Section 103 itself says is that what is patented must not
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art involved, at the time the invention was
made .... This is not a 'standard of invention' and it is not called a 'requirement of
invention.' ").
11. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
12. 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 248 (1850).
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Graham articulated a three-part test for determining nonobvious-
ness: (1) determine the scope and content of the prior art; (2) ascertain
the difference between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) re-
solve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
16
Since the enactment of section 103, there have been numerous de-
cisions involving the evidentiary burden required for establishing a
prima facie case of obviousness. From among a milieu of conflicting
rulings emerges a trend, particularly in the area of chemical patents.
Courts construing early chemical patents required only a showing of
structural obviousness of the novel chemical compound relative to prior
art compounds to create a presumption of obviousness.1 7 More recent
cases have required not only structural similarity, but a suggestion in the
prior art that the novel composition would have the new property.
1 8
II. EVOLUTION OF PRIMA FACIE OBVIOUSNESS IN CHEMICAL
CoMPOsrrIONS CASES
This section examines the role of composition properties in obvi-
ousness determinations. 19 Chemical compounds present a special prob-
lem for nonobviousness analysis. 20 Chemical bonds are formed based
on well known rules. These rules provide the skilled chemist, presented
with a structure on paper, with the ability to synthesize the compound.
2 1
The nonobviousness analysis problem is to determine whether the in-
ventor simply created a novel compound which has the desired proper-
ties by searching through prior disclosures and making minor structural
adjustments to a known composition. This question has driven the judi-
cial quest for a standard to distinguish the nonobvious chemical com-
pound claim.
2 2
16. Id. The Court also stated that secondary considerations of "commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." Id. at
17-18.
17. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 35-78 and accompanying text.
19. As used in decisions interpreting section 103, the properties of a chemical compo-
sition are its uses or utilities. A property of a novel composition is said to be unexpected if
it was not previously possessed by related prior art compositions. It is said to be unexpect-
edly improved if the property is shared by the prior art and novel compositions and if the
novel composition demonstrates an unexpectedly improved effectiveness in that shared
property over the prior art composition. A novel composition is said to demonstrate ac-
tual differences from the prior art composition if it does not share the unexpected prop-
erty with the prior art composition. Ifa property of a novel composition is actually shared
with a prior art composition, a distinction is also made as to whether it was known that the
prior art composition possessed the property. Thus, an unexpected property of a novel
composition may be truly new and not actually possessed by prior art compounds, or it
may be new only in the sense that the property was not previously known to be possessed
by prior art compositions.
20. See Note, Standards of Obviousness and the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 607, 607 (1974) ("Perhaps no area of patent law is more uncertain than that con-
cerning the application of the section 103 test of 'nonobviousness' . . to chemical com-
pounds ....").
21. See D. CHiSUM, PATENTs § 5.04(b), at 5-312 (2d ed. 1990).
22. There are various articles on the standard for determining nonobviousness in
chemical compounds. See Blodget, Relative Significance-A Concept in Chemical Structural Obvi-
1991]
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Prior to the enactment of section 103, an obviousness determina-
tion required a demonstration of close structural relatedness between
the novel composition and the known compositions. 23 Underlying this
early rule was the presumption that structurally similar chemicals have
similar properties. In the early cases, a presumption of obviousness
could be rebutted by a showing that the novel composition possessed a
property not actually possessed by related prior art compositions.
2 4
These early cases do not generally refer to a "prima facie" case of obvi-
ousness; rather, they refer to presumptions or determinations of
obviousness.
2 5
In re Hass26 examined the patenting of homologs of prior art com-
pounds. 27 The court ruled that "[n]ovel members of a homologous se-
ries of chemical compounds must possess some nonobvious or
unexpected beneficial properties not possessed by a homologous com-
pound disclosed in the prior art."
'28
In re Henze 29 extended the ruling of Hass. Henze placed a "presump-
tion of unpatentability" on a composition of matter claim for which the
adjacent homolog was old in the art.30 The court placed the burden on
the applicant to rebut the presumption by showing that the claimed
compound possessed unobvious or unexpected beneficial properties not
actually possessed by the prior art homolog.3 l The court considered it
immaterial that the known compound was not "[r]ecognized or known to
be useful for the same purpose or to possess the same properties as the
claimed compound."
'3 2
To rebut the presumption of obviousness derived from structural
ousness Cases, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 69 (198 1) (justifying the use of the relative significance
of claimed compound with similar structure in the prior art to rebut a presumption of
obviousness); Marquis, An Economic Analysis of the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 63 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3 (1981) (presenting an economic analysis of the effectiveness for stan-
dards of patentability in chemical compounds and using the analysis to compare the grav-
ity of a composition claim based on a novel use against the granting of a method claim).
See also Note, supra note 20 (assessing the standards for patentability of novel chemical
compounds).
23. In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (overruled by In re Stemniski, 444
F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
24. Henze at 201.
25. Id.
26. 141 F.2d 130 (C.C.P.A. 1944). This is the third of three companion cases. The
other two are In re Hass, 141 F.2d 127 (C.C.P.A. 1944) and In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122
(C.C.P.A. 1944).
27. "A series of compounds in which each member differs from the next member by a
constant amount is called a homologous series, and the members of the series are called
homologs." R. MORRISON & R. BOYD, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 101 (2d ed. 1966). All mem-
bers of a homologous series of chemicals tend to possess the same principle characteris-
tics. Knowledge of the properties and chemical behavior of one member of a homologous
series suggests the properties and chemical behavior of another member of a series. Hass,
141 F.2d at 125.
28. Hass, 141 F.2d at 125.
29. 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (overruled by In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d 581
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
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similarity, the Henze court required that the novel composition contain a
novel property not actually shared by prior art compositions.3 3 The
court indicated that a mere improvement in a property shared with prior
art compositions was not sufficient to impart nonobviousness.
3 4
In re Papesch35 synthesized the Hass-Henze doctrine in light of section
103. The novel compound possessed a structure similar to compounds
in the prior art. The prior art compounds, however, did not possess
certain anti-inflammatory capabilities present in the novel compound.
36
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals and Interferences
(Board) rejected the composition claim on the basis of obviousness due
to structural similarities.3 7 The Board stated that the compound was so
similar to the prior art, its obviousness was beyond doubt.3 8 The Board
noted that the fact that compound possessed properties nonexistent in
the prior art could be used only to resolve doubt.
3 9
The Court of Claims and Patent Appeals reversed, stating that the
Board's finding that a showing of properties was necessary only to re-
solve doubt rested on a "fundamental error of law." 40 The court ruled
that since a compound is inseparable from all of its properties, an obvi-
ousness determination requires the consideration of both similarities in
properties and structures.
4 1
The scope of the Hass-Henze rule was limited by several later cases.
In re Mills4 2 limited the legal presumption of obviousness to only adja-
cent homologs. The court found that the prior art compositions con-
taining alkyl sulfates of C8-C1 2, compounds useful as anti-caking agents
in detergents, did not create a presumption of obviousness for methyl
(Cl) sulfates, another type of anti-caking agent.43 The court ruled that
the Henze presumption of obviousness was applicable only to immedi-
ately adjacent homologs and not more distant members of the homolo-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
36. Id. at 383.
37. Id. at 385.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 386.
40. Id. at 391.
41. Id. at 391-92. The court said:
From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its properties are in-
separable; they are one and the same thing .... And the patentability of the
thing [compound] does not depend on the similarity of its formula to that of
another compound but of the similarity of the former compound to the latter.
There is no basis in law for ignoring any property in making such a comparison.
The other factor of importance [in an obviousness determination] is that the prior
art disclosure was not merely of a structurally similar compound but also, at least
to a degree, of the same desired property relied on for patentability in the new com-
pound. Such an 'other factor' must of course be considered because it bears on
the obviousness of the compound, which is, realistically and legally, a composite
of both structure and properties.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
42. 281 F.2d 218 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
43. Id. at 221.
1991]
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gous series. 44
The Hass-Henze rule was further limited by In re Stemniski.4 5 In
Stemniski the claimed compounds had an antioxidant property not known
to be possessed by prior art compounds. In fact, the prior art com-
pounds had no known utility. Ruling that the claimed composition was
nonobvious, the court suggested that it was immaterial whether the
prior art compounds actually had antioxidant properties.4 6 The court
explicitly overruled Henze, indicating that the Henze rule does not apply
where the applicant describes a utility for the novel composition, and
the prior art does not disclose or suggest any usefulness for the prior art
compounds.4 7 The court suggested that the applicant was under no ob-
ligation to demonstrate that the unexpected property of the novel com-
position was not actually possessed by the prior art compounds.
4 8
The Stemniski limitation was extended in In re Albrecht.4 9 In Albrecht
the novel composition exhibited unexpected antiviral activity not pos-
sessed by the closest prior art compound. The prior art compound pos-
sessed anesthetic activity but was unsuitable for such use because it
caused skin irritation. The Board found that prima facie obviousness
was not rebutted by the unexpected antiviral activity.50 It ruled that the
inventor had the burden to show that the novel composition did not
produce anesthetic activity.
5 1
Reversing the Board, the court stated that the unexpected antiviral
activity did rebut prima facie obviousness.5 2 The court reasoned that
there was no motivation for those skilled in the art to synthesize the
related novel composition because the prior art disclosed the unsuitabil-
ity of the known compounds for use as anesthetics.
53
The Hass-Henze doctrine was further limited by In re Chupp.54 Chupp
involved a claim for a herbicide structurally similar to prior art herbi-
cides. To rebut prima facie obviousness, the applicant submitted evi-
dence showing that the novel composition produced superior herbicidal
results. 55 The court stated that evidence to rebut prima facie obvi-
ousness "may include data showing that a compound is unexpectedly
44. Id. The court stated:
Where, as here, the invention for which a patent is sought relates to one member
of an homologous series and the disclosure of the prior art is of a non-adjacent
member of the series. [sic] In re Henze ... is not authority for a 'legal presump-
tion' of obviousness of the claimed invention.
Id. (citation omitted).
45. 444 F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
46. See id. at 587.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 587.
49. 514 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
50. Id. at 1393.
51. Id. at 1396.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 816 F.2d 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
55. The superior herbicidal property in Chupp concerned selective weed-killing
properties (controlling quackgrass and yellow nutsedge without damaging corn or soy-
beans). Id. at 644.
266 [Vol. 68:2
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superior in a property it shares with prior art compounds .... Evidence
that a compound is unexpectedly superior in one of a spectrum of com-
mon properties, as here, can be enough to rebut a prima facie case of
obviousness.
' '56
By the 1980s, prima facie obviousness decisions began to explicitly
require an analysis of similarity of properties. In In re Grabiak57 the
court ruled that a novel composition exhibiting "safening" 58 activity in
herbicides was not prima facie obvious. 59 The court reasoned that there
was no suggestion in the closest prior art that the structural change be
made nor was there sufficient evidence indicating that the safening activ-
ity was predictable even for closely related structures.60 The court
stated that "[w]hen chemical compounds have very 'close' structural
similarities and similar utilities, without more a prima facie case may be
made." 6 1
In re Payne6 2 contains a similar prima facie analysis. The court ruled
that a prima facie case was made because there was a close structural
similarity with prior art compounds and because the pesticidal activity of
the novel composition was a known property of the prior art com-
pounds. The court stated:
An obviousness rejection based on similarity in chemical struc-
ture and function entails the motivation of one skilled in the art
to make a claimed compound, in the expectation that the com-
pounds similar in structure will have similar properties.
The similarity in chemical structures and properties between
the prior art and claimed compounds is sufficiently close to
support a prima facie case of obviousness.
63
56. Id. at 646. We note that the Chupp ruling is directly contrary to dicta in Henze
indicating that a mere improvement in a shared property is not sufficient to impart nonob-
viousness. See Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
57. 769 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
58. A safener protects growing crops from weed killers. Id. at 729.
59. Id. at 732.
60. Id. at 732-33.
61. Id. at 731.
62. 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
63. Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted). See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
where the court held that the Patent Office had not established a prmafacie case of obvi-
ousness because the combination of elements of applicant's gas chromatograph/detector
was not suggested by the prior art and because the temperature range limitation on the
system claims had a different purpose than the temperature range specified in the prior
art. It was immaterial that there was some overlap in the temperature ranges. Id. at 1074-
75. See also In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988) where the court held that the
Patent Office had not established a prima facie case because none of the cited references
suggested the claimed combination of Wright's structure (an improved carpenter's level)
as a solution to the problem of increasing pitch measurement capacity. Id. at 1220. The
court in Wright said:
The determination of whether a novel structure is or is not 'obvious' requires
cognizance of the properties of that structure and the problem which it solves,
viewed in light of the teachings of the prior art.
Thus the question is whether what the inventor did would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art attempting to solve the problem upon which the
inventor was working.
1991]
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A line of post-Henze cases discuss balancing the significance of the
unexpected property of the novel composition with the significance of
the expected properties of the prior art composition.
6 4 In re Nolan6 5
used a balancing test to determine whether the unexpected property of a
novel device was sufficiently significant to rebut evidence of obvi-
ousness.6 6 It found that the unexpected properties did not have a sig-
nificance equal to or greater than that of the expected property to rebut
the other evidence of obviousness.
6 7
A balancing approach was also applied in In re De Montmollin6 8 and
In re Mod.69 De Montmollin involved the rejection of a claim for a water
soluble dye used for dying wool, cotton and cellulose. 70 The prior art
dyes were of a similar structure and could be used for dying wool.
7 1
The appellant argued that the rejection failed to consider the unex-
pected use (cotton and cellulose dyeing) not mentioned in the prior
art.7 2 The court stated that "a single variance in the properties of new
chemical compounds will [not] necessarily tip the balance in favor of
patentability where otherwise closely related chemical compounds are
involved."
7 3
In re Mod involved a claim for a novel antimicrobial agent. 74 The
prior art compounds were structurally related and shared the property
of insecticidal activity with appellant's novel compound. 75 The prior art
compounds, however, did not possess antimicrobial activity. 76 After
balancing the unexpected antimicrobial activity against the shared ex-
Id. at 1219 (citations omitted).
64. See znfra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. While the function of this balancing
is not readily apparent, it is performed following the initial determination of prima fade
obviousness. In at least some of these decisions, it appears that the balancing is done to
determine whether the new or unexpected property is sufficiently significant to rebut the
prima facie case of obviousness.
65. 553 F.2d 1261 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
66. The Nolan invention was an improvement in a gaseous discharge display/memory
device having an electrical memory and the capability of producing a visual display. The
improvement comprised the use of a defined ionizable gaseous medium containing neon
and a small percentage of rare gas (argon, krypton and xenon). Id. at 1262. The device
had the benefits of higher memory margin, higher luminous efficiency, and lower peak
discharge current through the use of the claimed gas mixture. The court found the higher
memory margin to be expected in view of the prior art, and the higher luminous efficiency
and lower peak discharge current to be unexpected properties. Id. at 1267.
67. Id. at 1267.
68. 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
69. 408 F.2d 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
70. 344 F.2d at 977.
71. Id. at 978.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 978 (emphasis in original). The court held:
The claimed substances, as well as those in the prior art, are water soluble materi-
als useful as dyes. Both sets of compounds have the property of being wool dyes
and both result in dyeings on wool fabrics which are fast to washing and fulling.
Under the circumstances and weighing the available evidence, we do not regard the
additional ability to dye cotton sufficient to render the subject matter as a whole
unobvious.
Id. at 978-79 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
74. 408 F.2d 1055, 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
75. Id. at 1055-56.
76. Id. at 1056.
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pected property, the court ruled that the invention was obvious. 77 It
noted that the unexpected antimicrobial activity was not sufficiently sig-
nificant to find nonobviousness. 78
III. THE IN RE DILLON DECISION
There are two In re Dillon decisions. The first is the Federal Circuit
panel decision rendered on December 29, 1989 (the Panel Decision).
7 9
The second is the court's en banc rehearing decision rendered on No-
vember 9, 1990 (the en banc Decision).8 0
Dillon requested a patent for a novel composition comprising a hy-
drocarbon fuel and an effective amount of tetra-orthoesters, and a
method for reducing particulate emissions by the combustion of the
composition.8 1 Dillon's broadest composition claim was directed to a
composition comprising a hydrocarbon fuel and an amount of tetra-
orthoesters sufficient to reduce particulate emissions during the com-
bustion of the hydrocarbon fuel.8 2 Her broadest method claim was di-
rected to a method of reducing particulate emissions during the
combustion of hydrocarbon fuel by combusting a mixture of the hydro-
carbon fuel and an amount of tetra-orthoesters sufficient to reduce par-
ticulate emissions.
8 3
The Board rejected Dillon's patent application on obviousness
grounds. In doing so, the Board cited three prior art references. The
first cited reference taught a composition of tri-orthoesters mixed with
hydrocarbon fuels in order to "de-water" the fuel.8 4 The second cited
reference taught the use of tri-orthoesters in a mixture of hydrocarbon
fuels and immiscible alcohols where the tri-orthoeseters serve as co-sol-
vents to prevent phase separation between fuel and alcohol.8 5 The third
77. Id. at 1057.
78. Id. The court stated:
Inasmuch as the claimed compounds and those of [the prior art] do possess a
close structural relationship and it is not denied that they have a specific, significant
property in common, viz. insecticidal activity, we do not regard the additional
antimicrobial activity discovered by appellants for the claimed compounds suffi-
cient ground to hold that the subject matter as a whole is unobvious.
Id. (emphasis in original). A similar property-balancing analysis is conducted in Solder
Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978). In Sol-
der Removal the court stated "[w]here the reason for the practice suggested by the prior art
is much less significant than the reason derived from the inventor's solution to another
problem, the results may be so unexpected as to support a conclusion of nonobviousness."
Id. at 635.
79. 892 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1989), withdrawn and superseded, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
80. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990). On February 12, 1990, the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office filed a Petition for Rehearing en banc. Shortly thereafter, an
opposing petition by Ms. Dillon and several amicus curiae briefs were filed with the court.
On May 21, 1990, the Federal Circuit accepted Dillon for rehearing en banc and vacated the
December 29, 1989 panel decision.
81. 919 F.2d at 690-91.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 691.
85. Id.
1991]
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cited reference taught the use of tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthoesters as
water scavengers in hydraulic (non-hydrocarbon) fluids.
8 6
Dillon appealed the Board's decision. The appellate court panel
overturned the Board's decision stating that similarity of structure alone
does not establish a prima facie case of obviousness: "there must be
some reason, arising in the prior act, to expect that the claimed com-
pounds or compositions will have the properties found by the appli-
cant."' 87 The en banc court overruled the panel decision, and affirmed
the Board's rejection of Dillon's patent.8 8 The court found that the
prior art neither taught a fuel composition comprising tetra-orthoesters
for any use nor specifically taught or suggested the use of tetra-orthoes-
ters to reduce particulate emission in the combustion of hydrocarbon
fuels.8 9 The court ruled that there was no evidence of a relationship
between the properties of water-scavenging and reducing particulate
emissions upon combustion. 90
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Dillon Rules
While the en banc Dillon decision does resolve a number of inconsis-
tencies appearing in prior cases, it does so at the expense of inventors.
It has the practical effect of placing a greater evidentiary burden on the
inventor by making it easier for the Patent Office to establish prima facie
obviousness.
The court stated that although a composition is novel and its new
property is not shown or suggested by the prior art compositions, a
prima facie case of obviousness for the composition is made where the
examiner can show that: (1) prior art compounds possess similar struc-
tures to the novel composition, and (2) the prior art gives a reason or
motivation to make the claimed novel compositions. 9 1
According to the court, an applicant can rebut a prima facie case by
showing one of the following: (A) the claimed composition possesses
properties not actually possessed by prior art compositions (Option A);
(B) the claimed composition possesses an unexpectedly improved prop-
erty shared with prior art compounds (Option B); or (C) the prior art is
so deficient that chemists have no motivation to make obvious composi-
tional changes (Option C).92 The court suggests a further rebuttal op-
tion of arguing the relative importance of the claimed compositions
compared with the prior art.93 This option is similar to Option C.
94
86, Id. at 690-91.
87. 892 F.2d 1554, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
88. 919 F.2d at 698.
89. Id. at 691.
90. Id. at 694.
91. Id. at 692. The court notes that the reason or motivation need not be related to
the new problem solved by the novel composition. Id. at 692-93.
92. Id. at 693.
93. Id. at 694.
94. ld. at 692-93. By pointing out that Dillon failed to argue the relative importance
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As to the elements necessary to establish a prima fade case, the Dil-
lon decision is consistent with Hass9 5 and Henze,96 but inconsistent with
such later cases as Payne,9 7 Grabiak,98 Fine,9 9 and Wright.10 0 As regards
the options for rebuttal of a prima fade case: Option A is consistent
with Henze;' 0 Option B is consistent with Chupp;10 2 and Option C and
related dicta regarding "relative importance" of properties are reminis-
cent of the property balancing cases of De Montmollin,' 0 3 Mod, 10 4 No-
/an,10
5 and Solder Removal.1
0 6
The court also overruled Wright '0 7 to the extent that it is contrary
to the en banc definition of a prima fade case.108 The court said that a
prima fade case does not require a suggestion in, or an expectation
from, the prior art indicating that the claimed composition will have the
newly discovered and unexpected property.' 0 9
B. Implications for Biotechnology Practice
The underlying premise of Dillon is that compositions having similar
structures predictably have similar properties. This premise, however,
often fails in the field of biotechnology.
Many patent law practitioners characterize biotechnology and
chemistry inventions as having similar levels of predictability relative to
mechanical inventions.110 Some aspects of biotechnology, however, are
of her composition compared with the prior art, the court suggests that such arguments
may have been considered by the court in rebuttal of the prima facie obviousness. Id. at
695. Unfortunately, Dillon, operating on the assumption that Wright was good law, appar-
ently did not present these arguments to the Board, although they were presented in her
Brief in Opposition to Rehearing. Brief for Appellant Dillon in Opposition to Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 9, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (No.
88-1245). Given the overwhelming significance of the emission reduction property rela-
tive to the de-watering property, it is not inconceivable that had Dillon made the signifi-
cance arguments, her composition claims may have been held to be nonobvious.
95. In re Hass, 141 F.2d 122 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
96. In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (overruled by In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d
581 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
97. In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
98. In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
99. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
100. In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
101. Henze, 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
102. In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
103. In re De Montmollin, 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
104. In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
105. In re Nolan, 553 F.2d 1261 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
106. Solder Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
107. In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
108. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
109. Id. The court indicates that even a use limitation in a composition claim (such as
Dillon's limitation that the tetra-orthoester quantity be sufficient to reduce particulate
emissions) will not save a novel composition from an obviousness rejection where struc-
tural similarity to prior art compositions and any motivation to synthesize the novel com-
position have been established. Id. at 693 n.4.
110. See, e.g., R.P. Blackburn, Comments Made at American Intellectual Property Law
Association's Chemical and Biotechnology Practice Course (Chicago (Sept. 14, 1990); San
Francisco (Oct. 5, 1990); and Newark (Nov. 2, 1990)).
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so clearly empirical that they eliminate any predictability of properties
based on similarities of structure.1 1 1 The relative unpredictability in
some aspects of biotechnology is due to the fact that small variations in
structure may or may not result in significant changes in biological
function. 
1 12
For example, the Board has acknowledged the empirical, unpredict-
able nature of monoclonal antibodies." 13 The effect of a single amino
acid or nucleotide substitution in a sequence on the biological function
of the sequence is empirical; thus, the effect on biological function can-
not be known or even predicted with a reasonable amount of certainty
until the substitution is performed and the sequence tested for biologi-
cal function.
14
The relative unpredictability of biological activity of molecules is
directly contrary to the underlying premise of Dillon, i.e., that structur-
ally similar compositions have similar properties.1 15 The following hy-
potheticals illustrate the inequities that can result from the application
of the Dillon rule to biotechnology inventions.
For example, assume it was known in the art that glycoprotein "A,"
having a known amino acid sequence, is an integral membrane protein
in murine muscle cells. Further assume that it was known that the pro-
tein functions in the transport of certain nutrients across the cell mem-
brane by receptor-mediated endocytosis. The question becomes
whether a novel glycoprotein "B" having a 90% amino acid sequence
homology with "A" is deemed nonobvious if it were found to function
as a viral accession site in human muscle cells. The "A" glycoprotein
was previously isolated, characterized and used to manufacture
monoclonal antibodies useful in the diagnosis of certain genetic disor-
ders related to deficient nutrient uptake by muscle cells. In addition to
discovering that glycoprotein "B" is a human muscle cell viral accession
site, purified "B" has been found by the inventor to mitigate infection by
the virus when administered to infected individuals. Purified "B" has
great medical value in the abatement of viral infection of human muscle
cells. Although not previously known, the inventor has also determined
that "A" has a viral accession function in murine muscle cells.
I 11. See, e.g., Kalusa, Alvarez-Morales & Hennecke, Oligonucleolide-directed Mutagenests of
the Rhzzobzumjaponicum nfH Promotor[sic], 188 FED'N OF EUR. BIOCHEM. Soc'Y 37, 41 (1985)
[hereinafter Olgonucleotide-directed Mutageness].
112. B. ALBERTS, D. BRAY, J. LEwIs, M. RAFF, K. ROBERTS &J.D. WATSON, MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 97-100 (2d ed. 1989).
113. See, e.g., Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f
1986) where the Board states:
Although the technique underlying hybridoma technology is well recognized,
nevertheless, the results obtained by its use clearly are unpredictable.
Hybridoma technology is an empirical art in which the routineer is unable to fore-
see what particular antibodies will be produced and which specific surface anti-
gens will be recognized by them. Only by actually carrying out the requisite steps
can the nature of the monoclonal antibodies be determined and ascertained; no
"'expected" results can thus be said to be present.
114. See, e.g., Oligonucleotide-drected .Mlulagenests, supra note 111.
115. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Applying the Dillon rule to this scenario, "B" is deemed prima fade
obvious over "A" because it is structurally similar and there would be
some motivation to isolate and sequence "B" to determine and utilize its
nutrient transport function. It is not possible to rebut the prima facie
case by showing that "B" contains a property not actually possessed by
prior art "A" (Option A) because "A" was determined by the inventor
to have the same viral accession function in murine muscle cells. It is
also not possible to rebut the prima fade case by demonstrating an un-
expectedly improved property (Option B). Furthermore, the prima facie
case cannot be rebutted by demonstrating that there is no motivation
provided in the prior art to sequence "B" (Option C). The only possible
means of rebutting the prima facie case is to provide evidence showing
that the unexpected property of viral accession is more significant than
the expected property of nutrient transport.
The Dillon court did not articulate criteria by which to judge the
relative significance of expected and unexpected properties. In De
Montmollin,116 Mod,"I7 and Nolan,118 however, none of the unexpected
properties were held to be sufficiently significant relative to the expected
properties. While it is difficult to know at this stage of the law whether
the viral accession property of "B" would be deemed more significant
than the nutrient transport property of "A," it seems unlikely. The
medical significance of each function seems roughly equivalent. It
seems unlikely that the inventor would be able to rebut the prima facie
case by showing superior significance.
This outcome is inequitable because the viral accession property of
"B" is truly unpredictable from the structure of "A" or its nutrient
transport or viral accession functions. Just because "A" demonstrates
viral accession function does not mean that structurally related "B,"
having 10% amino acid substitution over "A," will also have a viral ac-
cession function.
In some situations, where an unexpectedly improved property of
the novel composition can be shown, the Dillon rule will not have a nega-
tive impact. For example, ribulose 1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase, also
known as "Rubisco," is the enzyme that catalyzes the reaction of CO 2
with 1,5-bisphosphate to form two molecules of 3-phosphoglycerate. 119
Rubisco is located on the stromal surface of thylakoid membranes in
chloroplasts. In addition to its carboxylase activity, Rubisco also cata-
lyzes a competing oxygenase activity. 120 The oxygenase and carboxy-
lase reactions are carried out at the same active site and compete with
each other. The rate of the carboxylase reaction is four times that of the
oxygenase reaction under normal atmospheric conditions at 25"C. The
oxygenase reaction is considered wasteful as it produces a product,
116. In re De Montmollin, 344 F.2d 976, 978-79 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
117. In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055, 1057 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
118. In re Nolan, 553 F.2d 1261, 1267 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
119. L. STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 534 (3d ed. 1988).
120. Id. at 535-36.
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phosphoglycolate, which is not a very versatile metabolite. 12 1 If an in-
ventor were able to alter the amino acid sequence of Rubisco sufficiently
to improve the carboxylase activity relative to the oxygenase activity, it
could provide plants with improved efficiency in carbon dioxide fixation.
Such a plant would have great commercial value because it would sub-
stantially improve crop yields.
122
Under the Dillon rule, the inventor could rebut the prima facie case
of obviousness by demonstrating an unexpectedly improved property
over prior art compositions. The property would be unexpectedly im-
proved because the improvement in carboxylase activity could not have
been reasonably predicted from the amino acid substitutions employed.
While it would be "obvious to try" various substitutions, until such sub-
stitutions were performed and tested in biological systems, their effect
on carboxylase activity could not be known or predicted with reasonable
certainty. 123 Consequently, an "obvious to try" substitution is not an
acceptable basis for an obviousness rejection.'
2 4
Biotechnology is an infant industry which typically requires large
expenditures in research and development in order to obtain a market-
ready product. Many investors have become frustrated with the expense
and time required for development of new products.' 25 Because many
biotechnology inventions cannot be adequately protected as trade
secrets, it is incumbent upon the patent system to recognize the need for
adequate protection for novel compositions having unexpected proper-
ties which might otherwise not be discovered without the benefit of the
system. The vacated Dillon panel recognized this need:
There is merit to the classical explanation that the incentive to
study new variations of known compounds and compositions,
in order to search for new uses, would be diminished if such
new compounds and compositions cannot be patented despite
discovery of new and unobvious properties. The contrary view
carries scant counter-balancing public benefit.
12 6
In the glycoprotein "A" and "B" hypothetical, the "B" amino acid
sequence exhibiting viral accession activity in human muscle tissue
could be easily reverse engineered. Once a pharmacological product
containing effective amounts of "B" was on the market, "B" could be
easily sequenced and its sequence could not be maintained as a trade
secret. Thus, without adequate protection under the patent system, the
inventor cannot recoup sunk coStS127 or benefit from the fruits of his
inventiveness.
The net result of this failure to protect and reward may be to dis-
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id.
123. Ex parte Old, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1986).
124. Id.
125. Gianturco, Biotechnology Isn't Dead, FORBES, May 1, 1989 at 410.
126. In ?e Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1989), withdrawn and superseded, 919
F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
127. Set infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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courage biotechnology innovations. This consequence will not only be
a blow to many industries-such as the agricultural, medical and phar-
maceutical industries-but also a loss to society since these innovations
can vastly improve our quality of life.
C. Economic Policy Implications
The cost to society of granting a patent must be offset by the social
benefit flowing from the innovation. 12 8 In this regard, the patent system
serves as a mechanism through which competing interests are balanced.
This section briefly examines the economic policy implications of the
Dillon decision.
The Dillon claims involve a fuel composition which reduces air pol-
lution from the operation of diesel-motored engines. The question
arises: What incentive did Union Oil of California (Unocal)129 have to
develop this fuel composition? It would appear that in a highly competi-
tive market, Unocal has very little incentive. Assuming that truck drivers
are more interested in the price of fuel than in its features, drivers will
tend to buy the lowest priced product. If Unocal (or any other pro-
ducer) attempts to internalize the research and development costs of its
innovation, demand will favor the lower cost non-innovative competi-
tor's fuel.13 0 Consequently, fuel producers have no incentive to develop
cleaner fuels and governmental regulation of pollution emissions be-
comes necessary.
Ironically, it is governmental regulation which ultimately spurs
much of private research and development in this area. In anticipation
of regulation, fuel producers begin developing fuel compositions aimed
at satisfying the expected governmental requirements. Once the regula-
tion is promulgated, the company which first develops and patents the
128. See generally Marquis, supra note 22 at 58-62. The article discusses private costs
and value versus social cost and value and how it relates to analyzing the patent law
system:
Granted, that there results an increment in national product attributable to inven-
tions that are generated, or whose application is accelerated, by the patent incen-
tive. Against this, however, must be set the reduction in national product that is
attributable to restriction in the use of those inventions which are patented but
which would have appeared at the same time without patent incentive and would
have been free for unrestricted use by anybody.
Id. at 63. See also Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 at 10-11 ("Mhe underlying policy
of the patent system that 'the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent,' as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited
patent monopoly.").
129. Unocal was Dillon's employer.
130. See Marquis, supra note 22 at 58-62. The article discusses why the marginal cost of
the research and development is zero and, therefore, in a competitive market with no pat-
ent protection the innovator cannot recover sunk costs of development. The author
states:
If the invention is used competitively-by anybody who cares to, and without re-
strain or payment-the quantity of goods produced will be so large that the price
at which they are sold will cover no more than the marginal cost; hence, the sell-
ing price will contain nothing for the use of the invention, no return on the sunk
investment.
Id. at 59.
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innovative fuel composition recoups its sunk costs by licensing fees to
other producers who must meet the new standards.
The Dillon en banc decision serves to undermine this incentive. By
placing a greater evidentiary burden on the inventor, the en banc deci-
sion makes it more difficult to obtain composition patents. Composition
patents are generally regarded as more valuable than process patents
because the former allows the patentee to exclude others from selling
the composition, as well as precluding others from actually making or
using it.13 Faced with a lower likelihood of obtaining the more valuable
composition patents, fuel producers are motivated to shift resources
away from research and development and into other more profitable ar-
eas. As a result, society ultimately suffers because of the disincentive
provided to private industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors believe that progress in the useful arts is ill-served by
the en banc Dillon decision. The law as set forth in Dillon increases the
evidentiary burden on the inventor without any appreciable benefit to
the public. The decision impairs the capacity of the patent system to
protect and reward those who develop novel compositions having unex-
pected properties. In this regard, applying Dillon to biotechnology in-
ventions may result in incorrect obviousness determinations and
discourage further innovations in the biotechnology industry.
131. U.S.C. § 154 (1988) states that "[elvery patent shall contain ... a grant ... of the
right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United
States ...."
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